Descripción del título
Incomplete contracts and in...
When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem
Monografía
monografia Rebiun22980318 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun22980318 m o d cr bn||||||abp cr bn||||||ada 100712s2006 dcu ob i000 0 eng d 68182895 189859717 OCLCE eng pn OCLCE CUS OCLCQ GZM MNU STF OCLCO OCLCF CDS OCLCQ OCLCA MERER OCLCQ dlr a-pk--- Jacoby, Hanan Incomplete contracts and investment a study of land tenancy in Pakistan Hanan G. Jacoby, Ghazala Mansuri [Washington, D.C.] World Bank, Development Research Group, Rural Development Team [2006] [Washington, D.C.] [Washington, D.C.] World Bank, Development Research Group, Rural Development Team 1 online resource (34 pages) 1 online resource (34 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Policy research working paper 3826 Includes bibliographical references (pages 26-28) Use copy. Restrictions unspecified star. MiAaHDL When contracts are incomplete, relationship-specific investments may be underprovided due to the threat of opportunistic expropriation or holdup. The authors find evidence of such underinvestment on tenanted land in rural Pakistan. Using data from households cultivating multiple plots under different tenure arrangements, they show that land-specific investment is lower on leased plots. This result is robust to the possible effects of asymmetric information in the leasing market. Greater tenure security also increases land-specific investment on leased plots. Moreover, variation in tenure security appears to be driven largely by heterogeneity across landlords, suggesting that reputation may be important in mitigating the holdup problem Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] HathiTrust Digital Library 2010. MiAaHDL Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Land tenure- Pakistán Land tenure. Pakistán Electronic books Mansuri, Ghazala Print version Jacoby, Hanan. Incomplete contracts and investment. [Washington, D.C.] : World Bank, Development Research Group, Rural Development Team, [2006] (OCoLC)64938240 Policy research working papers 3826