



Being in time : dynamical models of phenomenal experience /

Edelman, Shimon

Fekete, Tomer

Zach, Neta

John Benjamins Pub. Co.,

2012

Monografía

Given that a representational system's phenomenal experience must be intrinsic to it and must therefore arise from its own temporal dynamics, consciousness is best understood -- indeed, can only be understood -- as being in time. Despite that, it is still acceptable for theories of consciousness to be summarily exempted from addressing the temporality of phenomenal experience. The chapters comprising this book represent a collective attempt on the part of their authors to redress this aberration. The diverse treatments of phenomenal consciousness range in their methodology from philosophy, throu

<https://rebiunoda.pro.baratznet.cloud:28443/OpacDiscovery/public/catalog/detail/b2FpOmNlbGVicmF0aW9uOmVzLmJhcmF0ei5yZW4vMzM4ODA4OTA>

Título: Being in time dynamical models of phenomenal experience edited by Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete, Neta Zach

Editorial: Amsterdam Philadelphia John Benjamins Pub. Co. 2012

Descripción física: 1 online resource

Mención de serie: Advances in consciousness research 88

Bibliografía: Includes bibliographical references and index

Contenido: Being in Time; Editorial page; Title page; LCC data; Table of contents; Introduction; Conclusion; Time after time; 1. Introduction: Ubiquitous time; 2. A middle way: Dynamical systems; 3. Brainspace; 4. Temporality now!; 5. Countdown to implementation; 6. Crossing the explanatory gap; Acknowledgements; References; Neuronal reflections and subjective awareness; 1. Introduction- the optimistic outlook; 2. The creative nature of visual perception; 3. A colossal library; 4. Building templates- hierarchically; 5. A combinatorial explosion; 6. The ambiguity inherent in isolated responses 7. Neuronal reflections8. Experimental consequences; 9. What is so unique about the cerebral cortex?; 10. Is consciousness a local or global phenomenon?; 11. Is visual awareness dependent on higher levels of the cortical hierarchy?; References; From probabilities to percepts; 1. Introduction; 2. The ubiquity of sensory ambiguity and its absence from sensory consciousness; 3. An orthogonal order of estimates and the 'precedence of the gaze'; 4. Design features of a global best estimate buffer; 4.1 The neural numerology of sensory experience 4.2 Our panoramic, nested, ego-centric, three-dimensional visual world4.

3 "Just in time" for the next gaze movement: brief career of the global best estimate; 5. Cortex, colliculus and "the other thalamus"; 6. Conclusion; References; Being in time; 1. A few more constraints on theories of phenomenal experience; 1.1 Autonomy; 1.2 Timeliness; 1.3 Computational tractability; 2. Implications of the autonomy of experience; 3. Time is of the essence; 4. Waiting for Godot; 4.1 The attractor hypothesis; 4.2 The way ahead; 5. Computational tools for distributed dynamic coordination; 6. Summary AcknowledgmentsReferences; The (lack of) mental life of some machines; 1. Introduction -- special laws;; 2. One bit at a time; 3. How detailed is detailed enough?; 4. Not all machines are born equal; 5. Conclusion; Acknowledgements; References; Restless minds, wandering brains; 1. Introduction; 1.1 Escaping robustness; 2. Perceptual switching; 3. An EEG-study of perceptual mind wandering; 4. The dynamics of mind-wandering; 5. What happens to the laminar intervals when observers do engage in a task?; 6. Conclusion; Acknowledgement; References; Fuzzy consciousness; 1. Introduction 2. Cylinder sets3. The pushing and pulling of consciousness; 4. Discussion; References; Two dynamical themes in Husserl; 1. Background; 2. Horizon theory/constitution; 3. Transcendental-eidetic phenomenology; 4. Conclusion; References; Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousness; 1. Introduction: Unity, holism, and temporal continuity; 2. Mereotopology as a new tool for the study of consciousness; 2. A critical application: Does an experience have temporal parts?; 3. "Self-embedding": Sketch of a positive proposal; 4. Conclusion; References; The brain and its states

Lengua: English

Copyright/Depósito Legal: 798795618 817096164 960200016 961681678 962611200 988418716 991927886 994988295 1037710958 1038672113 1038683199 1045527315 1062897526 1066430137 1081235420 1153048394 1259124564

ISBN: 9789027273598 electronic bk.) 9027273596 electronic bk.) 1280879521 9781280879524 9789027213549 9027213542 9786613720832 6613720836

Materia: Phenomenological psychology Experience- Psychological aspects Consciousness Time Consciousness Time Psychologie phénoménologique Expérience- Aspect psychologique Conscience Temps time PSYCHOLOGY- Cognitive Psychology SCIENCE- Cognitive Science Consciousness Experience- Psychological aspects Phenomenological psychology Time

Autores: Edelman, Shimon Fekete, Tomer Zach, Neta

Enlace a formato físico adicional: Print version Being in time. Amsterdam ; Philadelphia : John Benjamins Pub. Co., 2012 9789027213549 (DLC) 2012016358 (OCOLC)793226702

Punto acceso adicional serie-Título: Advances in consciousness research v. 88

Baratz Innovación Documental

- Gran Vía, 59 28013 Madrid
- (+34) 91 456 03 60
- informa@baratz.es