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Employee crime, monitoring,...
This paper offers some observations on employee crime, economic theories of crime, limits on bonding, and the efficiency wage hypothesis. We demonstrate that the simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring and large penalties for employee crime. Finding overwhelming empirical evidence that firms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance and do not impose extremely large penalties, we investigate a number of possible reasons why the simple model's predictions fail. It turns out that plausible explanations for firms large outlays on monitoring of employees also justify the payment of premium wages in some circumstances. There is no legitimate a priori argument that firms should not pay efficiency wages once it is recognized that they expend significant resources on monitoring
Monografía
monografia Rebiun36591704 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun36591704 m o d cr unu|||||||| 871013s1987 mau ob 000 0 eng d 763124494 1091134266 1419851259 UAO ocn326896678 SCPER eng pn CUSER OCLCQ NTE OCLCE OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCF OCLCQ SXT NBERS OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCL OCLCQ dlr n-us--- X700 X800 330 OCoLC Employee crime, monitoring, and the efficiency wage hypothesis William T. Dickens [and others] Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02138) National Bureau of Economic Research 1987 Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02138) Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02138) National Bureau of Economic Research 1 online resource (21 pages) 1 online resource (21 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series ; working paper no. 2356 "August 1987." Includes bibliographical references (pages 20-21) Use copy. Restrictions unspecified star. MiAaHDL This paper offers some observations on employee crime, economic theories of crime, limits on bonding, and the efficiency wage hypothesis. We demonstrate that the simplest economic theories of crime predict that profit-maximizing firms should follow strategies of minimal monitoring and large penalties for employee crime. Finding overwhelming empirical evidence that firms expend considerable resources trying to detect employee malfeasance and do not impose extremely large penalties, we investigate a number of possible reasons why the simple model's predictions fail. It turns out that plausible explanations for firms large outlays on monitoring of employees also justify the payment of premium wages in some circumstances. There is no legitimate a priori argument that firms should not pay efficiency wages once it is recognized that they expend significant resources on monitoring Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] HathiTrust Digital Library. 2024. MiAaHDL Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL digitized 2024. HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL Employee theft Industrial efficiency Wages and labor productivity Vol domestique Efficience dans l'industrie Salaires et productivité Employee theft. Industrial efficiency. Wages and labor productivity. Dickens, William T. National Bureau of Economic Research Print version Employee crime, monitoring, and the efficiency wage hypothesis. Cambridge (1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass. 02138) : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1987 (OCoLC)16844445 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) working paper no. 2356