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Pareto efficient tax struct...
Most analyses of optimal income taxation make restrictive technical assumptions on preferences (such as single-crossing) and only derive properties of welfare-maximizing tax schedules. Here, for an economy with any finite numbers of groups and commodities, Pareto efficient tax structures are described assuming only continuity and monotonicity of preferences. Most results follow directly from a property of self-selection: at an optimum, one group will never envy the bundle of another group which pays a larger total tax. The bundle of a group paying the largest total tax is undistorted. Assuming normality, undistorted outcomes for a group form a connected segment on the constrained utility possibility frontier. The tax structure at distorted outcomes is also described
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monografia Rebiun36714964 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun36714964 m o d cr unu|||||||| 900425s1990 maua ob 000 0 eng d UAO ocn326893773 SCPER eng pn CUSER OCLCQ NTE OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCF OCLCQ SXT NBERS OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ 330 OCoLC E jelc Pareto efficient tax structures Dagobert L. Brito [and others] Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research [1990] Cambridge, MA Cambridge, MA National Bureau of Economic Research 1 online resource (25, [6] pages) illustrations 1 online resource (25, [6] pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series ; working paper no. 3288 "March 1990." Includes bibliographical references (page 25) Most analyses of optimal income taxation make restrictive technical assumptions on preferences (such as single-crossing) and only derive properties of welfare-maximizing tax schedules. Here, for an economy with any finite numbers of groups and commodities, Pareto efficient tax structures are described assuming only continuity and monotonicity of preferences. Most results follow directly from a property of self-selection: at an optimum, one group will never envy the bundle of another group which pays a larger total tax. The bundle of a group paying the largest total tax is undistorted. Assuming normality, undistorted outcomes for a group form a connected segment on the constrained utility possibility frontier. The tax structure at distorted outcomes is also described Income tax- Mathematical models Utility theory- Mathematical models Impôt sur le revenu- Modèles mathématiques Income tax- Mathematical models. Utility theory- Mathematical models. Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics. Brito, Dagobert L. National Bureau of Economic Research Print version Pareto efficient tax structures. Cambridge, MA : National Bureau of Economic Research, [1990] (OCoLC)21426458 Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) working paper no. 3288