Descripción del título

The paper studies an idealized gold standard in a two-country setting. Without flexible national domestic credit expansion (dce)policies which offset the effect of money demand shocks on international gold reserves, the gold standard collapses with certainty in finite time through a speculative selling attack against one of the currencies. Various policies for postponing a collapse are considered. When a responsive dce policy eliminates the danger of a run on a country's reserves, the exogenous shocks disturbing the system which previously were reflected in reserve flows, now show up in the behaviour of the public debt. Unless the primary (non-interest) government deficit is permitted to respond to these shocks, the public debt is likely to rise (or fall) to unsustainable levels. For the idealized gold standard analysed in the paper, viability can be achieved only through the active and flexible use of monetary and fiscal policy
Monografía
monografia Rebiun36501827 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun36501827 m o d cr ||||||||||| 120107s1989 mau o 000 0 eng d 72448547 1027369867 1119436418 1243108761 UAO ocn756571864 DKDLA eng pn DKDLA OCLCQ COO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ KIJ WYU YOU BWN OCLCO OCLCF OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ 332.452 OCoLC A "Gold Standard" Isn't Viable Unless Supported by Sufficiently FlexibleMonetary and Fiscal Policy Willem H. Buiter Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1989 Cambridge, Mass. Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1 online resource 1 online resource Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series no. w1903 ]note: King's username and password for off campus access.]. The paper studies an idealized gold standard in a two-country setting. Without flexible national domestic credit expansion (dce)policies which offset the effect of money demand shocks on international gold reserves, the gold standard collapses with certainty in finite time through a speculative selling attack against one of the currencies. Various policies for postponing a collapse are considered. When a responsive dce policy eliminates the danger of a run on a country's reserves, the exogenous shocks disturbing the system which previously were reflected in reserve flows, now show up in the behaviour of the public debt. Unless the primary (non-interest) government deficit is permitted to respond to these shocks, the public debt is likely to rise (or fall) to unsustainable levels. For the idealized gold standard analysed in the paper, viability can be achieved only through the active and flexible use of monetary and fiscal policy Patrón oro- Econometric models Monetary policy- Econometric models Étalon-or- Modèles économétriques Politique monétaire- Modèles économétriques Patrón oro- Econometric models. Monetary policy- Econometric models. Buiter, Willem H. National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. w1903