Descripción del título
"Last-place aversion" : evi...
Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data
Monografía
monografia Rebiun36672322 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun36672322 m o d cr ||||||||||| 110725s2011 maua ob 000 0 eng d 1065720620 UAO ocn742343277 OUN eng pn OUN GZM OCLCQ FIE OCLCF YOU WYU OCLCQ EYM NBERS OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCL 330 C91 jelc D31 jelc D72 jelc H23 jelc I3 jelc J38 jelc "Last-place aversion" evidence and redistributive implications Ilyana Kuziemko [and others] Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research ©2011 Cambridge, Mass. Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 1 online resource (53 pages) illustrations 1 online resource (53 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier NBER working paper series no. 17234 Includes bibliographical references (pages 33-36) Why do low-income individuals often oppose redistribution? We hypothesize that an aversion to being in "last place" undercuts support for redistribution, with low-income individuals punishing those slightly below themselves to keep someone "beneath" them. In laboratory experiments, we find support for "last-place aversion" in the contexts of risk aversion and redistributive preferences. Participants choose gambles with the potential to move them out of last place that they reject when randomly placed in other parts of the distribution. Similarly, in money- transfer games, those randomly placed in second-to-last place are the least likely to costlessly give money to the player one rank below. Last-place aversion predicts that those earning just above the minimum wage will be most likely to oppose minimum-wage increases as they would no longer have a lower-wage group beneath them, a prediction we confirm using survey data Income distribution- Psychological aspects Minimum wage- Public opinion Revenu- Répartition- Aspect psychologique Salaires minimums- Opinion publique Minimum wage- Public opinion. Public Policy. Welfare and Poverty. Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes. Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections. Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions. Laboratory, Individual Behavior. Kuziemko, Ilyana National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) no. 17234