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Epistemic Logic and the The...
The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades and this book explores this further by gathering specialists from different professional communities, i.e., economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. This volume considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, with each contribution evaluating the foundational issues. In particular, emphasis is placed on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem. Part I of this collection deals with iterated knowledge in the multi-agent context, and more particularly with common knowledge. The first two papers in Part II of the collection address the so-called logical omniscience problem, a problem which has attracted much attention in the recent epistemic logic literature, and is pertinent to some of the issues discussed by decision theorists under the heading `bounded rationality'. The remaining two chapters of section II provide two quite different angles on the strength of S5 (or the partitional model of information)- and so two different reasons for eschewing the strong form of logical omniscience implicit in S5. Part III gives attention to application to game theory and decision theory
Monografía
monografia Rebiun38406732 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun38406732 m o d cr mnu---uuaaa 121227s1997 mau o 000 0 eng 1243553081 1244630391 9781461311393 electronic bk.) 146131139X electronic bk.) 9780792348047 0792348044 146131139X 10.1007/978-1-4613-1139-3 doi AU@ 000051720812 NZ1 14983069 NZ1 15312832 AU@ eng pn AU@ OCLCO GW5XE OCLCF UA@ COO OCLCQ UAB OCLCQ TKN LEAUB OCLCQ EBLCP OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ KCA bicssc BUS069030 bisacsh 330.1 23 Bacharach, Michael Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions edited by Michael Bacharach, Louis-André Gérard-Varet, Philippe Mongin, Hyun Song Shin Boston, MA Springer US 1997 Boston, MA Boston, MA Springer US 1 online resource (xxxiii, 366 pages) 1 online resource (xxxiii, 366 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research 0924-6126 20 I Iterated Knowledge and Common Knowledge -- 1 On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge -- 2 A Complete Epistemic Logic for Multiple Agents -- 3 Axiomatic Indefinability of Common Knowledge in Finitary Logics -- 4 Eliminating Redundancies in Partition Spaces -- II The Logical Omniscience Problem -- 5 From Logical Omniscience to Partial Logical Competence -- 6 Knowledge and Belief Representation in a Partial Model -- 7 Awareness and Partitional Informational Structures -- 8 Representing the Knowledge of Turing Machines -- III Applications to Game Theory and Decision Theory -- 9 Logics for Nonomniscient Agents: An Axiomatic Approach -- 10 Alternative Definitions of Knowledge -- 11 Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games -- 12 Analyzing Games by Sequences of Metatheories -- 13 Rationally Justifiable Play and the Theory of Noncooperative Games -- 14 The Epistemic Structure of a Theory of a Game -- 15 On the Evaluation of Solution Concepts The convergence of game theory and epistemic logic has been in progress for two decades and this book explores this further by gathering specialists from different professional communities, i.e., economics, mathematics, philosophy, and computer science. This volume considers the issues of knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, with each contribution evaluating the foundational issues. In particular, emphasis is placed on epistemic logic and the representative topics of backward induction arguments and syntax/semantics and the logical omniscience problem. Part I of this collection deals with iterated knowledge in the multi-agent context, and more particularly with common knowledge. The first two papers in Part II of the collection address the so-called logical omniscience problem, a problem which has attracted much attention in the recent epistemic logic literature, and is pertinent to some of the issues discussed by decision theorists under the heading `bounded rationality'. The remaining two chapters of section II provide two quite different angles on the strength of S5 (or the partitional model of information)- and so two different reasons for eschewing the strong form of logical omniscience implicit in S5. Part III gives attention to application to game theory and decision theory Economics Genetic epistemology Economics- Methodology Économie politique Épistémologie génétique Économie politique- Méthodologie economics. Economics. Economics- Methodology. Genetic epistemology. Gérard-Varet, L.-A. Louis-André) https://id.oclc.org/worldcat/entity/E39PBJbWtybFXdQH4BmwGmjDMP Mongin, Philippe Shin, Hyun Song Print version 9780792348047 Theory and decision library. Series C Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research 20