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Rationality in Extensive Fo...
This book is concerned with situations in which several persons reach decisions independently and the final consequence depends, potentially, upon each of the decisions taken. Such situations may be described formally by an extensive form game: a mathematical object which specifies the order in which decisions are to be taken, the information available to the decision makers at each point in time, and the consequence that results for each possible combination of decisions. A necessary requirement for rational behavior in such games is that each decision maker should reach a decision that is optimal, given his preferences over his own decisions. This requirement is far from sufficient, however, since every decision maker should in addition base his preferences upon the conjecture that his opponents will act optimally as well. It is this principle that distinguishes noncooperative game theory from one-person decision theory. The main purpose of Rationality in Extensive Form Games is to discuss different formalizations of this principle in extensive form games, such as backward induction, Nash equilibrium, forward induction and rationalizability, under the assumption that the decision makers' preferences are given by subjective expected utility functions. The various formalizations, or rationality criteria, are illustrated by examples, and the relationships among the different criteria are explored
Monografía
monografia Rebiun38773310 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun38773310 m o d cr mnu---uuaaa 130330s2001 mau o 000 0 eng 934978146 9781475733914 electronic bk.) 1475733917 electronic bk.) 9781441949189 1441949186 1475733917 10.1007/978-1-4757-3391-4 doi AU@ 000051704355 NZ1 15182180 AU@ eng pn AU@ OCLCO GW5XE OCLCF UA@ COO OCLCQ EBLCP OCLCQ UAB OCLCQ TKN LEAUB OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ KCA bicssc BUS069030 bisacsh 330.1 23 Perea, Andrés Rationality in Extensive Form Games by Andrés Perea Boston, MA Springer US 2001 Boston, MA Boston, MA Springer US 1 online resource (v, 242 pages) 1 online resource (v, 242 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research 0924-6126 29 1 Introduction -- 2 Extensive Form Games -- 3 Backward Induction and Nash Equilibrium -- 4 Consistency and Sequential Rationality -- 5 Forward Induction -- 6 Transformations of Games -- 7 Rationalizability This book is concerned with situations in which several persons reach decisions independently and the final consequence depends, potentially, upon each of the decisions taken. Such situations may be described formally by an extensive form game: a mathematical object which specifies the order in which decisions are to be taken, the information available to the decision makers at each point in time, and the consequence that results for each possible combination of decisions. A necessary requirement for rational behavior in such games is that each decision maker should reach a decision that is optimal, given his preferences over his own decisions. This requirement is far from sufficient, however, since every decision maker should in addition base his preferences upon the conjecture that his opponents will act optimally as well. It is this principle that distinguishes noncooperative game theory from one-person decision theory. The main purpose of Rationality in Extensive Form Games is to discuss different formalizations of this principle in extensive form games, such as backward induction, Nash equilibrium, forward induction and rationalizability, under the assumption that the decision makers' preferences are given by subjective expected utility functions. The various formalizations, or rationality criteria, are illustrated by examples, and the relationships among the different criteria are explored Economics Econometrics Économie politique Économétrie economics. Econometrics. Economics. Print version 9781441949189 Theory and decision library. Series C Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research 29