Descripción del título
Coalition Formation and Soc...
Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games
Monografía
monografia Rebiun38289301 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun38289301 m o d cr mnu---uuaaa 130107s1997 mau o 000 0 eng 934973431 968640436 9781475725780 electronic bk.) 1475725787 electronic bk.) 9781441947819 1441947817 1475725787 10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0 doi AU@ 000051696081 NZ1 14988844 NZ1 15331208 AU@ 000072978221 AU@ 000077592465 AU@ eng pn AU@ OCLCO GW5XE OCLCF UA@ COO OCLCQ EBLCP OCLCQ YDX UAB OCLCQ TKN LEAUB OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ KCA bicssc BUS069030 bisacsh 330.1 23 Deemen, M. A. Coalition Formation and Social Choice by M.A. Deemen Boston, MA Springer US 1997 Boston, MA Boston, MA Springer US 1 online resource (x, 244 pages) 1 online resource (x, 244 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research 0924-6126 19 1 Introduction -- 2 Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory -- 3 Examples of Social Choice Rules -- 4 General Solutions for Social Choice Problems -- 5 Coalition Formation in Simple Games -- 6 Coalition Preferences -- 7 Coalition Formation in Social Choice Games -- References -- Symbols and Abbreviations Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games Economics Econometrics Economics Économie politique Économétrie economics. Econometrics. Economics. Print version 9781441947819 Theory and decision library. Series C Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research 19