Descripción del título
Economic Exchange and Socia...
This book aims at the development of an institutional approach to general economic equilibrium. It is argued that general equilibrium theory forms a well-rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic theory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this re-focusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modeled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. In the first part a summary of the well-established insights regarding the core of an economy is given. Next the book explores the extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism through core convergence results, the comparison of core allocations with Walrasian equilibrium allocations, and equivalence results. In the second part an alternative model of Edgeworthian barter in the setting of a large institutionally structured economy is developed. Two new Edgeworthian equilibrium concepts are considered - the semi-core and the contract-core. The book concludes by showing that equivalence is extremely hard to achieve and that perfect competition thus has a pathological nature
Monografía
monografia Rebiun38375677 https://catalogo.rebiun.org/rebiun/record/Rebiun38375677 m o d cr mnu---uuaaa 121227s1996 mau o 000 0 eng 968432249 1243554521 1244620399 9781461312857 electronic bk.) 146131285X electronic bk.) 9781461285496 1461285496 10.1007/978-1-4613-1285-7 doi AU@ 000051722647 NZ1 14983135 NZ1 15313172 AU@ eng pn AU@ OCLCO OCLCQ GW5XE OCLCF UA@ COO OCLCQ YDX UAB OCLCQ EBLCP OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCQ OCLCO OCLCL OCLCQ KCC bicssc BUS044000 bisacsh 338.5 23 Gilles, Robert P. Economic Exchange and Social Organization the Edgeworthian foundations of general equilibrium theory by Robert P. Gilles Boston, MA Springer US 1996 Boston, MA Boston, MA Springer US 1 online resource (328 pages) 1 online resource (328 pages) Text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Theory and Decision Library, Series C: Game Theory, Mathematical Programming and Operations Research 0924-6126 12 1 Scarcity and Gains from Trade -- 1.1 Gains from trade -- 1.2 Walrasian markets -- 1.3 Edgeworthian barter -- 1.4 Some historical roots -- 2 The Foundations of General Equilibrium -- 2.1 A reconstruction of commodity exchange -- 2.2 Preferences -- 2.3 Exchange systems -- 2.4 Problems -- 3 The Principles of Individual Exchange -- 3.1 Edgeworthian barter and markets -- 3.2 Existence of Walrasian equilibria -- 3.3 Edgeworthian stability -- 3.4 Problems -- 4 Properties of the Core in Finite Economies -- 4.1 Replica economies and equal treatment -- 4.2 The Debreu-Scarf theorem -- 4.3 The Vind-Anderson comparison theorem -- 4.4 Problems -- 5 The Primitives of Coalitional Exchange -- 5.1 Primitive coalitional structures -- 5.2 Contracts and trade coalitions -- 5.3 Social feasibility -- 5.4 Exchange systems -- 5.5 Problems -- 6 Barter in Coalitionally Structured Economies -- 6.1 Walrasian markets and the core -- 6.2 Edgeworthian barter processes -- 6.3 Core-Walras equivalence -- 6.4 Problems -- 7 Perfect Competition -- 7.1 Some examples -- 7.2 A non-equivalence theorem -- 7.3 Edgeworth versus Cournot -- 7.4 Perfect competition as a pathology -- 7.5 A changing world order -- 7.6 Problems -- References This book aims at the development of an institutional approach to general economic equilibrium. It is argued that general equilibrium theory forms a well-rounded basis for the development of an institutional economic theory. The fundamental economic trade mechanism underlying this re-focusing is that of the Edgeworthian barter mechanism modeled through the equilibrium notion of the core of an economy. In the first part a summary of the well-established insights regarding the core of an economy is given. Next the book explores the extensive literature that links the core with the Walrasian price mechanism through core convergence results, the comparison of core allocations with Walrasian equilibrium allocations, and equivalence results. In the second part an alternative model of Edgeworthian barter in the setting of a large institutionally structured economy is developed. Two new Edgeworthian equilibrium concepts are considered - the semi-core and the contract-core. The book concludes by showing that equivalence is extremely hard to achieve and that perfect competition thus has a pathological nature Economics Microeconomics Économie politique Microéconomie economics. Economics. Microeconomics. Print version 9781461285496 Theory and decision library. Series C Game theory, mathematical programming, and operations research 12